The Aviation & Space Journal

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E-mail: newsletter@islex.com
Registrazione presso il tribunale di Bologna n. 7221 dell’8 maggio 2002
Introduction

European Union (EU) air law\(^1\) safety, pertaining to manned aviation, divides air operations into several broad categories. Most obviously, there is commercial air transport (CAT), which refers to an operation to transport either passengers, cargo, or mail for remuneration or other valuable consideration. There is also general aviation, where flying takes place for no compensation. More precisely, general aviation is divided into non-commercial operations using complex motor-powered aircraft (NCC) and non-commercial operations using non-complex aircraft (NCO). Additionally, air law recognizes specialized operations (SPO), where the aircraft is used for activities like agriculture, construction, photography, and so forth. SPO, known in ICAO as aerial work, can be either commercial or non-commercial\(^2\).

In the case of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), often known as drones\(^3\), however, such a categorization is not ideal. This is because of the unique features of drones, including their small size, simplicity, inherently lower risk, and the ability to operate in an urban environment, which result in great potential for certain applications\(^4\). But also because, in case of drones, the risk is not for people on board, but for third parties in the air or on the ground. Hence, the new EU legal framework for drones does not distinguish between commercial and non-commercial, or aerial work and transport. Rather, the division is founded proportionately upon the risk of the operation, the characteristics of the system, and the operational environment\(^5\).

To this end, drone operations are split into three categories. The open category primarily incorporates leisure flying and simple professional applications using consumer grade drones. Therein, the operation is not subject to a prior authorization nor declaration, but it must follow strict limitations. The certified category, on the other hand, requires the operator to comply with rules similar to manned aviation. It is designed to regulate the most complex drones and operations, such as passenger transport or international cargo flights. Between these two extremes lies the specific category, where operations are authorized on an individual basis. The authorization details the exact conditions for flying.

\(^{*}\)Researcher and PhD Candidate at the University of Lapland, Finland.
The basis for the categorization was set forth in the 2018 Basic Regulation establishing the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)\(^6\), which has since been supplemented by the Implementing and Delegated Regulations, respectively for putting consumer drones on the EU market and for drone operations\(^7\).

Of the three categories, the open one seems the most obvious. It sets forth a fixed set of rules, which everyone wishing to operate in that category must follow. The basic rules for the certified one are also as clear as those applied to manned aviation although exact policies for the category are still, at the time of writing this, under development at EASA\(^8\). The specific category, being based on non-prescriptive rules, however, seems more of a *tabula rasa* than the other two. How exactly does the category incorporate common elements of aviation safety? To what extent are the adopted procedures comparable to rules pertaining to manned aviation?

In this article, I seek to answer the given questions. To do so, I take a look at three themes, which I consider the most central aspects of aviation safety regulated in the specific category: the authorization of air operators, the competency of pilots, and the airworthiness of aircraft. More specifically, I reflect on the new European Union rules on drones in comparison with the one previously established for manned aviation. Hence, much of my discussion involves detailing and comparing the features of the two systems with reference to EU regulations. I devote particular attention to the non-binding but recommended as Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC), Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA) method, which will play a central role in the specific category. My overarching argument is that the specific category represents a unique approach to aviation safety, since it seeks to incorporate traditionally distinct elements of aviation safety into a single process. In the concluding chapter, I also assess the advantages and problems of the approach taken in the category.

Many if not most rules pertaining to aviation have their basis in the provisions of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention) and the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) enacted by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)\(^9\). This also goes for the rules on manned aviation discussed here. However, the tripartite categorization of drone operations is a European innovation that is not derived from ICAO standards. Furthermore, the EU rules on drones are to be applied also in domestic aviation, rather than only in international aviation, the latter being the scope of the Chicago Convention and SARPs\(^10\). Finally, the SARPs under development regarding drones are not designed to be applied in the open and specific category of operations. Hence, to avoid confusion, in this article I only refer to rules of air law as they are set forth in EU documents\(^12\).

Besides international air law, I also leave out national air law on both manned and unmanned aircraft. Only a few remarks are presented on how the latter rules may have affected the content of the new EU rules. The reasoning behind this exclusion is the fact that when the Implementing and Delegated Regulation enter into force and become applicable, national rules on drones in Europe will lose most of their significance. Discussing them at this stage would bring little additional value in analyzing the European-wide specific category of operations.
The following discussion relies mainly on primary legislative material. This is simply because there is yet no EU case law relating to the questions at hand. On the side of literature, only a handful of works have commented on the new regulations on drones. All in all, the theme of the article could be characterized as highly topical but insufficiently researched. Therefore, this piece should be read as part of the groundwork for further studies on the regulation of unmanned aviation.

Authorization of Operators

- **The Traditional Model**

According to EU air law, operating a manned aircraft commonly requires a permission from the competent authority or a qualified entity (QE)\(^1\). Operations exempted from this rule include the ones using aircraft that fall outside the jurisdiction of EASA, such as historic, experimental, and certain lightweight aircraft (unless national law so requires)\(^2\). Additionally, EASA does not require non-commercial operations using non-complex aircraft (NCO) to acquire a permission. Otherwise, however, operators of aircraft must either declare their capability to comply with operational rules or hold an air operator certificate (AOC)\(^3\).

The exact rules for making a declaration or acquiring an AOC depend on the type of operation and aircraft. Capability must be declared in three cases: when engaging in non-commercial operations using complex motor-powered aircraft (NCC), when engaging in non-commercial specialized operations (SPO) using complex motor-powered aircraft, and when engaging in commercial SPO regardless of the complexity of the aircraft. Declaring capability means that the operator provides the competent authority with relevant information, such as the type of operation, type of aircraft, and statements about the airworthiness of the aircraft and the training of the crew. Additionally, the operator must notify the authority of the use of alternative means of compliance (AltMoCs)\(^4\), of any changes to the declaration or the use of AltMoCs, and of ceasing operation. Hence, the operator has an obligation to maintain compliance with the information given in the declaration and applicable requirements.\(^5\)

An AOC issued by the competent authority is, by EU law, only required for one (but probably the most demanding) type of operation: commercial air transport (CAT). To be certified for CAT, the operator must provide to the authority particular crucial information, such as a description of the proposed operation, organizational structure, and a copy of the operations manual. More importantly, though, the operator has to *demonstrate* to the authority several things: compliance with the EASA Basic Regulation, organizational obligations, rules relating to commercial air transport, as well as the airworthiness certification (or dry lease) of each their aircraft. This seems simple but is actually a very stringent process, requiring the operator to demonstrate sufficient personnel and training systems, airworthy aircraft, documentation like manuals and logs, systems and procedures for aircraft operation, a safety management system (SMS), insurance, finances, infrastructure, and so forth\(^6\). Many boxes need to be checked in order for an air transport business to begin operating.
• The Basic Structure of Operational Authorization

The specific category of drone operations takes an approach quite different from manned aviation. By default, for specific operations, the drone operator does not declare its competency nor applies for an AOC; rather they must undergo operational authorization (OA) before beginning their operation. The OA is not exactly comparable to the AOC. The latter, in manned aviation, is only issued for commercial air transport, while the former can involve all types of operations, including those labeled in manned aviation as SPO, like aerial surveys and inspections. The scope of the OA is thus wider, at least in terms of diversity in practical applications.

As a process, too, obtaining an OA is rather unique. To do so, the operator must perform a risk assessment to be evaluated by the competent authority. Naturally, risk assessments have been conducted in manned aviation for decades. However, in manned aviation risk assessment has been viewed as merely one element of the safety management system (SMS) of each organization. Pursuant to EU air law, an operator must establish a management system that, *inter alia*, identifies aviation safety hazards as well as evaluates and manages associated risks.

Risk assessment in the specific category is a broader concept, since it incorporates some elements categorized in traditional risk assessment as hazard identification or control (mitigation). Furthermore, in the specific category, risk assessment has legally a more fundamental role. It is not merely a mandatory feature of the operating organization, through which it must affirm that its operations are safe. Nor is it a supplementary means to aid the actual authorization process. Rather, it is the centerpiece of safety, constituting the vast majority of the authorization process as a whole. Risk assessment is the defining procedure of the specific category. As for the assessment itself, many elements appear familiar to aviation professionals. Pursuant to the Implementing Regulation, the assessment must first include a description of the operation: the purpose and complexity of the activities, the environment (population, type of airspace, and landscape), the features of the UAS, and the competence of the personnel. Second, one must identify risks, which includes both ground risks.

• The Method(s) of Risk Assessment

The Implementing Regulation’s description is, of course, abbreviated. To actually conduct a risk assessment, a more precise method is required. In manned aviation, numerous methods of risk assessment have been developed. The natural starting point of those methods is detailing the characteristics of the operation. The operation may have already begun (or other operators may have executed similar operations), which means that hazards can be identified and classified through operational observation. Another means of identification is process analysis, which involves experts listing potential hazards. Risk assessment itself focuses on the likelihood (probability, frequency) and severity of occurrence, and the assessment and control of risks to an acceptable level. Ideally, this involves probabilistic software modeling, which incorporates safety principles, hazard severity and likelihood, and the effectiveness and cost of control measures. However, a more rudimentary model involves a matrix where the likelihood and severity of a negative occurrence provides a particular value (the higher the worse). Unless the risk is completely unacceptable, mitigation measures (controls) should be considered to reduce it to as low as possible. Similar methods have also been applied to unmanned aviation.
Yet, for the specific category a distinct method, the Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA), has been developed. SORA is the work of a group of experts called the Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems (JARUS). The second edition of the document, which was published in early 2019, contains ten steps which the operator and competent authority can follow to determine how severe risks the drone operation poses to the environment. From the viewpoint of EU air law, SORA is planned as an acceptable means of compliance (AMC), that is, non-binding standards adopted by EASA to illustrate means to establish compliance with the Basic and Implementing Regulation.

In terms of methodology, SORA draws some inspiration from traditional methods. Similar to manned aviation, the method defines risk as a combination of probability and severity of an occurrence. The starting point of the assessment is the operator’s description (concept of operations, CONOPS) of all relevant information about the operation. Hazards, though, have been pre-identified by the drafters of the method. There is the ground risk of the drone hitting a person, and the air risk of the drone colliding with another aircraft. Hence, a particular impact energy of the drone(s) leads to a particular ground risk class (GRC), whereas operating in certain class of airspace at a certain altitude above a certain territory determines the air risk class (ARC). It is also possible for the competent authority or air navigation service providers (ANSPs) to map risks for a particular volume of airspace, which supersedes the SORA ARC procedure. The GRC and ARC can be lowered by using mitigation measures. Particularly, it may be necessary to apply tactical mitigations to reduce the risk of a midair collision—hence, the concept of tactical mitigation performance requirement (TMPR).

Based on the final GRC and ARC, the operator must use a matrix to establish the specific assurance and integrity levels (SAIL), which represent the level of confidence that the operation will stay under control. The established SAIL determines, through another matrix (colloquially, the “bingo table”), the extent to which the operator must comply with operational safety objectives (OSOs). OSOs concern, inter alia, the features and maintenance of the drone, which must be satisfied with a low, medium, or high level of robustness. The meaning of the levels is unique to each objective, though generally the low level requires self-declaration, the medium level requires providing supporting evidence, and the high level calls for validation by a third party. In some cases, fulfilling the OSO is optional. The assessment is finalized by considerations relating to the infringement of adjacent areas, and the writing of a safety portfolio.

To briefly illustrate how SORA functions, consider for instance a scenario where a small drone is used in aerial photography in a city. Operating VLOS in a populated environment with a drone that has typical kinetic energy of less than 700 joules puts the GRC at 4 (out of 10). Let us assume that the operator can apply mitigations that reduce the effects of ground impact to some extent, reducing the final GRC to 3. Since the operation takes place at an altitude of under 500 feet above ground in uncontrolled airspace (class G) over an urban area, the ARC is C (out of D). Combining these two classes, we find out that SAIL is level IV (out of VI). Based on this level, the operator must comply with the appropriate OSOs, such as that the competency of operator must be high, and that the recovery performance from technical issues must be medium.
Assessing the GRC and ARC necessarily requires taking into account the perspective of air traffic management (ATM). As hinted above, instead of relying on the criteria outlined in SORA to determine the risk classes, it is possible for operators to base their assessment on a risk mapping conducted by the air navigation service provider. To this end, the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol) is developing distinct Airspace Assessment Guidelines. To be precise, the purpose of the Guidelines is to play a part in the determination of the GRC and ARC by taking into account special interests on the ground (e.g. military installations) and all air traffic (including drone traffic pursuant to previous OAs) in a certain volume of airspace—factors not explicitly included in the SORA criteria. Hence, risk assessments to be conducted in the specific category will likely also incorporate elements external to the core SORA process. This will also include solutions like SAMWISE, which has been developed by an Italian QE to help operators to understand the risk of their operation before undertaking a full SORA.

- **Standardization Efforts**

From the process of operational authorization flows a concept that sets the specific category clearly apart from traditional air law: standard scenario (STS). According to the official definition, an STS refers to a type of UAS operation ... for which a precise list of mitigating measures has been identified in such a way that the competent authority can be satisfied with declarations in which operators declare that they will apply the mitigating measures when executing this type of operation. In other words, an STS is a set of operational parameters that have undergone the risk assessment process under the responsibility of a CAA, resulting in pre-defined conditions that provide an acceptable level of mitigation. It is an acceptable means of compliance with the Implementing Regulation. Its purpose is to relieve drone operators as well as authorities from the burden of repeatable similar risk assessments throughout Europe.  

In terms of substance, a standard scenario resembles an OA. Following here SORA terminology, there is a particular CONOPS. This includes, among other things, the level of human intervention, the population density of the overflown areas, the segment of airspace where the operation takes place, the technical features of the drone, the training of the remote crew, and whether the operation takes place within or beyond the visual line of sight of the pilot (VLOS, BVLOS). These factors lead to a GRC and ARC, which determine the SAIL level, which itself determines the relevant operational safety objectives: risk buffers, crew training, airworthiness, and so forth. Hence, an STS is based on operational aspects rather than the practical application of the operation, like photography or forestry. This is quite apparent from the first draft of an STS (as presented by JARUS during spring 2019), which concerns BVLOS aerial work operations over sparsely populated area in airspace reserved for the operation, using drones with a characteristic dimension of less than 3 meters.
The creation of STSs is, as of yet, unregulated. However, pursuant to a presentation given by EASA, we already have a good idea of the process. To begin with, STSs are created outside the normal authorization process. Whereas an OA is always applied for by a single operator, a standard scenario can be proposed by operators, drone manufacturers, and associations at the national or European level. When an STS is approved by a national competent authority, it becomes applicable only in that country, but the NCA can also propose it as an AltMoC to EASA. The Agency can then undertake a process of approving the STS as an AMC, which involves consulting an advisory drone committee and which will make the STS valid in all Member States. It is also possible to propose the STS directly to EASA itself. Scenarios that are feasible and have a high level of acceptability, a large number of potentially interested operators, and a significant impact on public health, are prioritized in the standardization process.

When an STS exists for the planned operation, the operator must simply declare that they will apply those measures. They need not undergo the normal authorization process. This solution, which is justified by Article 56(5) of the 2018 EASA Basic Regulation, likely draws upon and is somewhat comparable to the process adopted for specialized operations in manned aviation. That process, as described above, also requires the operator to only submit a declaration. However, while SPO is a category that includes a wide range of operations with varying conditions, an STS is a single operational model for a particular set of conditions: the distance of the aircraft from the crew, the areas that can be flown over, and performance limitations on the aircraft, to name a few. In any case, depending on the SS, the operator may need to provide evidence of the level of assurance determined through SORA, which may be documents or attestations issued by independent third parties.

Besides the OA and STS there is, though, another institution in the specific category that comes closer to AOCs issued in manned aviation: the light UAS operator certificate (LUC). Acquiring the LUC supplants the regular OA process, and is rather similar to obtaining an AOC. The operator must demonstrate its capabilities through measures like the establishment of a safety management system (SMS) and a manual that describes activities carried out within the organization. Still, the purpose of the LUC differs from the AOC. The LUC is chiefly intended as a tool to grant the most professional drone operators the privilege of being able to conduct operational risk assessments without involving the competent authority.

Competency and Fitness of Pilots

- **Pilots of Manned Aircraft**

Pilots of manned aircraft are commonly required to hold a pilot licence and ratings in order to fly. To acquire a licence, the pilot must first acquire theoretical knowledge about various topics, such as air law, technical matters, flight performance and planning, meteorology, navigation, operational procedures, and communications. Second, licensing requires practical skill regarding, *inter alia*, pre-flight and in-flight activities, collision avoidance, and flying by both visual and instrument reference. Knowledge and practical skill alike must be demonstrated both during training and after licensing through assessments and, in some cases, examinations. Thus, an appropriate level of both knowledge and practical skill has to be maintained. Additionally, it is worth pointing out that for certain functions (such as acting as the pilot in command), a pilot must also have sufficient experience.
The exact training requirements for a pilot depend on the type of aircraft (s)he wants to operate, and also on the type of operation. For example, there is a licence for flying a light aircraft, as well as for acting as an airline transport pilot. Ratings are more specific, concerning particular aircraft classes and types, equipment, and operations. Requirements for both licenses and ratings have been determined in a very detailed manner, including for example the topics that must be tested in written exams, the minimum hours of flight training and flying, and skill tests. The exact training requirements for a pilot depend on the type of aircraft (s)he wants to operate, and also on the type of operation. For example, there is a licence for flying a light aircraft, as well as for acting as an airline transport pilot. Ratings are more specific, concerning particular aircraft classes and types, equipment, and operations. Requirements for both licenses and ratings have been determined in a very detailed manner, including for example the topics that must be tested in written exams, the minimum hours of flight training and flying, and skill tests.

Besides a licence, pilots of manned aircraft must also hold a medical certificate. This requires them to periodically demonstrate, through assessments based on aero-medical best practice, their medical fitness. Fitness here signifies that the pilot does not suffer from any mental or physical disease or disability that makes the pilot unable to perceive their environment correctly, or unable to perform necessary operative tasks or assigned duties at any time. Naturally, as with licences, certification has to take into account the type of activity the pilot engages in, but additionally the possible age-based mental and physical degradation. Since 2018, special rules exist for further monitoring the mental fitness of the aircrew of particular aircraft.

- **Drone Pilots in the Specific Category**

On the rudimentary level, the competency standards of remote pilots in the specific category appear similar to those employed in manned aviation. According to the essential requirements established in the EASA Basic Regulation, a drone pilot (regardless of category) must be aware of all operational rules. They must have the ability to ensure the safety of operation, including the separation of the drone from other airspace users and people on the ground. A pilot must also have good knowledge of operating instructions, of all relevant functionalities of the drone, and of applicable rules of the air and procedures relating to air traffic management (ATM). Medical fitness must be demonstrated if the risks involved in the operation so demand.

The requirements for specific category drone pilots, as set forth in the Implementing Regulation, are equally elementary. At minimum, pilots must be able to plan flights and inspect their aircraft, manage the flight path and automation of their aircraft, and maintain situational awareness. They must also be able to manage aeronautical communication. Additionally, basic competency includes skills like problem solving, decision-making, workload management, leadership, teamwork, and self-management. Handing over the drone to another pilot also falls within basic competency, as does coordination in general. Overall, a drone pilot in the specific category must have the capacity to fly the drone in both normal and emergency conditions.

On a closer look, there are a number of important differences in the regulation of regular and drone pilots. Most notably, the Implementing Regulation or any other regulation does not set forth a separate procedure through which a pilot could acquire the necessary license or ratings to conduct certain operations with certain types of UAS in the specific category. One’s competency to fly in the specific category is not assessed generally nor independently. There is no “specific category remote pilot licence” that would always authorize the pilot to fly. Rather, the competency requirements of the pilot (and the crew as a whole) are determined through the operational authorization or the standard scenario as part of a holistic assessment.
How is the competency of the crew evaluated, then, as part of the risk assessment? Following JARUS’s SORA, one must first determine the SAIL level for the CONOPS, which in turn determines the operational safety objectives regarding crew competency. In all cases, regardless of SAIL, the operator must propose training that is both theoretical and practical. The operator must ensure that the crew has adequate (in relation to the proposed operation) knowledge of drones themselves, drone regulations, and principles for operating drones in airspace. Additionally, the crew must know of airmanship, aviation safety, human performance limitations, meteorology, air navigation by charts, and operating procedures. Other OSOs depend on the SAIL. When the low level of assurance is required, the training is self-declared but documented. In the case of the medium level, a training syllabus must be available (for the authority to assess) and the operator is itself responsible for the training. At the high level, the syllabus and the crew’s competency have to be verified by a competent third party.

The competency of the crew is specified with regard to other safety objectives, too. When the SAIL is III or higher, the crew must be trained to procedures and checklists in order to safely recover from human error. If the operation involves multi crew coordination, this must be covered in the training. As the risks increase, crew resource management training is also required. If the operation involves adverse environmental conditions, meteorological training is necessary.

The given requirements established in SORA give a slightly more detailed indication of the training of pilots in the specific category. However, to a great extent the assessment process operates on a very general level and is open-ended. It does not dictate the exact flight experience and testing necessary to determine that a particular pilot has “adequate knowledge” of a particular topic. Nor does it say what a training syllabus for a particular OSO level must include. Indeed, SORA explicitly states that it does not provide a regulatory framework for states to apply with respect to training and licensing, among other things. Since this is the case, there remains the possibility (and perhaps necessity) to devise the exact training standards for particular missions under the auspices of operators, authorities, and training organizations across Europe.

Evaluating the fitness of the crew, like the competency thereof, is also part of the risk assessment. Hence, one OSO set forth in SORA is that the remote crew is fit to operate, which refers to both physical and mental fitness. At the low level of integrity and assurance, the operator must have a documented policy that defines how the crew can declare themselves fit to operate prior to any operation. At the medium level, the operator must define and document adequate duty, flight duty, and resting times for the crew, and also define requirements appropriate for the crew to operate the drone. Duty cycles must also be logged, and the operator must be provide evidence about the crew’s fitness. At the high level, the crew must have medical fitness pursuant to authoritative standards and verification, and there must be a system for fatigue risk management in place and monitored by a third party who also has to validate duty times for the crew.
Airworthiness

- Certifying Manned Aircraft

In Europe and elsewhere, the safety of aviation as a whole has traditionally relied a lot on the safety of aircraft. In other words, the system has been aircraft centric. The key concept in this regard is airworthiness, which is a key issue of EASA. According to the Basic Regulation, every aircraft within the Agency’s jurisdiction must comply with essential airworthiness requirements. This includes also their engines, propellers, parts, and non-installed equipment. Airworthiness is achieved through three measures: product integrity, product operation, and organizational approval.

Among other things, the first means that the aircraft can withstand its designed use for the duration of its operational life; the second that the aircraft can safely be controlled in its designed use; and the third that the design, production, and maintenance organizations have the necessary capabilities to do their duties.

More specifically, the airworthiness of aircraft is achieved through a layered system. First, any organization that designs aircraft must demonstrate its capability to do so, holding an approval. Then, any aircraft designed by an organization must be certified for its safety, that is, initial airworthiness (type certification, TC). Type certification is a stringent process, which often takes several years and basically involves four steps: establishing a certification basis, agreeing on a certification programme, demonstrating compliance with rules, and issuing the certificate. It requires the design to comply with a myriad of standards listed in the certification specification (CS) for the particular category of aircraft, such as “normal-category aeroplanes”.

It is necessary to point out that aircraft parts and appliances must also show compliance. Besides certifying the design of the aircraft type, each individual aircraft must undergo certification, after which it is issued a certificate of airworthiness, CofA. This requires that the aircraft conforms to the type certificate issued for its design, and that it is in condition for safe and environmentally compatible operation. The CofA is valid for the aircraft as long as it is maintained in accordance with the rules pertaining to continuing airworthiness. Continuing airworthiness means first that the organizations who are in charge of maintaining aircraft are approved, and that the personnel doing so are licensed. Second, maintenance must be performed in accordance with a heap of standards. The aircraft as well as all relevant organizations are also inspected regularly.

- Assessing the Integrity of Drones

In terms of airworthiness, the specific category follows the given regulatory approach on a rudimentary level. The Basic Regulation requires that unmanned aircraft (regardless of category) must be designed and constructed as airworthy, essentially referring to the same three methods as with manned aircraft. Drones must provide product integrity proportionate to the risk; they must be operable so that the safety of people and property can satisfactorily be demonstrated; and the organizations that design, produce, and maintain UAS must have the necessary means for the scope of their work and ensure compliance with EU air law on drones.
However, in the specific category, the actual system of ensuring airworthiness is very different from that established for manned aircraft. According to the Delegated Regulation, only particular drones in the specific (and certified) category must hold a type certificate and be maintained in a certified manner. This includes drones that have a characteristic dimension of 3 meters or more and are designed to be operated over assemblies of people; drones that are designed for human transportation; drones that are designed for transporting dangerous goods; or drones whose certification is required by the operational authorization. In either of these cases, the aforementioned system of certification applies all the way, pursuant to the standards that are still under development.

If none of the criteria applies, pursuant to the operation-centric approach, the drone must have the technical capabilities set forth in the operational authorization or the standard scenario.

Airworthiness, then, also falls within the ambit of the risk assessment. Indeed, JARUS’s SORA explicitly notes that the method can be applied where traditional certification is not appropriate, and that it may support the process of determining airworthiness requirements. For this purpose, SORA incorporates many elements of traditional airworthiness certification, which—similar to standards of crew competency—are established as operational safety objectives that follow from the SAIL level of the CONOPS.

As a corollary to type certification and manufacturing standards, one OSO established in SORA is that drones have to be developed to recognized design standards. SORA does not include such standards, though, as it simply refers to standards considered adequate by the competent authority. Another objective dealing with TC is that the drone must be manufactured by a competent and/or proven entity. At the low level, this standard mainly covers materials and is assured through declaration; at the medium level, it extends to matters like inspections and testing, and storage, which are assured through evidence; at the high level, the standard also includes qualifications of the manufacturing personnel and supplier control, which are recurrently verified through audits. Additional OSOs regarding initial airworthiness concern the design of the UAS with regard to system safety and reliability, characteristics of the command, control, and communication link(s), safe recovery from technical issues, the deterioration of supportive systems, system that automatically protects the flight envelope, and design for adverse environmental conditions.

It is worth noting that the EU is funding a project (AW-DRONES) to develop a meta-standard supporting OSOs through consensus-based voluntary industry standards (e.g. prEN 4709-001 or ISO 21384-2).

Continuing airworthiness is addressed by an obligation to maintain the UAS by a competent and/or proven entity. At the low level, the drone must be maintained by competent and authorised maintenance staff in accordance with documented instructions. Maintenance performed on the UAS must be logged, and the operator must keep an updated list of their staff and the qualifications thereof. The medium level of integrity and assurance requires additional safeguards, such as scheduled maintenance, a maintenance program developed pursuant to authoritative standards, and systematic training for the staff. The high level necessitates a maintenance procedure manual, validation of the maintenance program, and a program for recurrent staff training. Besides maintenance, there is an objective for the crew to conduct and document inspections on the UAS, which at the high level are validated by a competent third party.
Conclusions

- Structural Differences

The traditional system of aviation safety relies on a multilayered approach. In other words, the safety of flying is ensured through a combination of diverging elements. These include, in particular, the three themes discussed in this article: controlling the capability of each operator to handle all tasks necessary for safe aviation; establishing and enforcing licensing and fitness criteria for people involved in the operation of aircraft, including especially pilots; and certifying, monitoring, and maintaining the physical condition of each aircraft type and individual aircraft. In particular, given the emphasis on airworthiness, the system can be characterized as aircraft centric.

Legally speaking, the three elements operate as individual institutions. Operators are authorised through declarations and certification, and they have their unique obligations relating to organizational safety management. The competency of pilots is regulated through a different set of regulations than the airworthiness of aircraft, so the two things are evaluated separately and according to different criteria. Yet, the elements are also connected and complementary to each other. Every operator, for example, has an overarching duty to ensure the airworthiness of its aircraft and the competency of its employees. Additionally, the type certification of aircraft must take into account factors like the average skill of pilots, and each pilot bears the responsibility for conducting a pre-flight check to finalize the airworthiness of the aircraft before every take-off.

Similar to traditional aviation law, the specific category of drone operations views aviation safety as a combination of elements. The difference is, however, that the specific category attempts to encapsulate all elements into a single, joint process: the risk assessment. This incorporates not only the approval of the operator itself, but matters that are traditionally controlled separately. One of such matters is the airworthiness of drones, as only drones passing a particular threshold will have to hold a traditional type certificate. The assessment therefore involves evaluating the drone with regard to its manufacturing standards and manufacturer, technical features, as well as maintenance procedures and oversight. Part of the process is also to ensure the qualifications, knowledge, training, experience, and fitness of the crew.

Risk assessment, hence, does not merely refer to the activities conducted as part of the safety management system of air operators. While the assessment borrows some elements therefrom, its scope is broader and its purpose more fundamental than that of traditional risk assessment. The assessment seeks to take into account every aspect of safe aviation in one process that determines the conditions for each operation. However, SORA is simultaneously simpler than the methods used in manned aviation, which sometimes utilize high-end solutions like probabilistic software modelling. Rather than being a tool of self-analysis, SORA seeks to provide a symmetrical way to provide similar operational conditions for similar drone operations across Europe. Therefore, the method pre-identifies the types and scale of risks an unmanned aircraft may pose to its environment, and the extent of mitigations necessary to bring such risks to a more acceptable level.
It must be acknowledged, however, that risk assessment, at least in its current formulation as the Specific Operations Risk Assessment, leaves certain issues unregulated. Such include, for example, the exact training syllabi for remote pilots and the standards for the safe design of drones. This suggests that aviation safety in the specific category will not utterly depend on the assessment procedure, but also on supplementary, non-binding industry standards. The difference with the traditional system remains, though, that such standards will only work as sub-elements of the assessment procedure, and that the competent authority can exercise plenty of discretion as to what constitutes sufficient compliance with the relevant safety objective.

Advantages and Shortcomings

What are the pros and cons of the approach taken in the specific category? On the positive side, the category introduces a lot of flexibility into the regulation of unmanned aircraft systems. It acknowledges the great variance in drone equipment and practical applications, the lack of global standards for drone technology and pilot competency, and the uncertainties and potential of unmanned aviation. An attempt to create a “one size fits all” approach, especially in the case of aerial work, would risk stifling the emerging industry. To take one simple case, aerial photography above urban areas and aerial inspections above agricultural land require different operational limitations, safeguards, and so forth. Some of the necessary flexibility is already built into the tripartite main categorization (open, specific, and certified), but the specific category establishes a framework for further case-specific consideration. Overall, the category helps small to medium businesses to offer drone services without spending years to grasp the whole scope of traditional air law.

On the negative side, such flexibility may of course increase risks caused by drones to the general public. By establishing a risk assessment process that deals with many questions at once, the specific category loses some of the refined structure and attention to detail on which the safety of civil aviation has been built upon. Thus, much attention has to be devoted to the thorough consideration of all operational aspects during the assessment.

Another problem is that the case-specific approach creates a lot of pressure on competent aviation authorities across Europe. While the SORA method provides a yardstick to assess the proportionate risk of each scenario, it still leaves the actual assessments to be executed at the national level—or at the European level by cooperating national authorities. Hence, much coordination is required between the authorities in order to create harmonized operational conditions in every EASA Member State. After all, requirements should be the same for the same type of drone operations, regardless of which authority issues the operational authorization. A related issue is establishing clear and harmonized boundaries between the specific and certified category, although SORA provides guidance in this regard, too.

Luckily, the system of air law already provides one solution to the given problem. Qualified entities, as briefly mentioned above, can be charged with certain tasks otherwise falling within the duties of authorities. Furthermore, the specific category introduces a specialized solution to the issue of recurring assessments: standard scenarios. The STSs enable EASA and aviation authorities of member states to create uniform models for particular operations, including provisions on operator, training, airworthiness, and flight rules.
For common operation types, at least, achieving symmetrical standards within Europe is thus possible. The STSs also ease the burden of both operators and authorities by enabling conformity through declaration rather than authorization. One natural caveat in the system is, though, that drafting STSs takes time.

The system of standard scenarios has not been without its critics. Most notably, the European Cockpit Association (ECA)—the representative body of European air pilots—has pointed out that an STS may make operating a drone too easy, emphasizing that an STS can only work for its exact intended scenario. A scenario is a holistic package, rather than a toolbox, so changing even one element of the package should always trigger the operational authorization process. Furthermore, according to the Association, operating on the basis of declaration should only be allowed after sufficient experience with SORA and STSs has been gathered by relevant stakeholders.  

It is easy to agree with ECA on the holistic nature of standard scenarios. To give a basic example, there is a big difference in operating in class C airspace as opposed to class G. Changing such a parameter drastically alters the risks and nature of the operation, which SORA does recognize. The comment about having sufficient experience with SORA before accepting declarations should also be given serious consideration, though what this means in practice is less easy to say. After all, declarations are only envisioned as sufficient in cases where the risks have been considered so thoroughly that repetitive assessments are not necessary; this is the purpose of STSs. Since drone operations of various types have been practiced around Europe (and elsewhere) for years, the industry has already accumulated plenty of experience of the risks involved. SORA and STSs are simply a translation of the risks into a systematized format. Regardless, since it is difficult at this stage to fully grasp the total volume of future drone operations, prudence must be practiced when choosing what kind of STSs are first developed. While EASA appears to prioritize impactful and feasible scenarios with real demand, the safety-oriented approach might be to begin from scenarios with an inherently low risk. The experience gained this way would help standardizing complex cases.

**Controversy over Risk Assessment**

A particularly controversial aspect of the specific category, as hinted above, is the SORA method of risk assessment. To an aviation professional, the method may seem overly simple and permissive; in contrast, to a drone operator the procedure may appear too complex and restrictive. The truth, according to JARUS, is somewhere between these extreme viewpoints. As unmanned operations bring together a diverse collection of stakeholders, striking a balance between their views is necessary. The procedure envisioned by JARUS indeed seeks to address the interests of both experts and laymen. It derives many of its aspects from traditional models, but does not require special training to use.

Such an approach may, of course, risk establishing a false balance between views of those with the appropriate knowledge and experience of aviation safety, and those without. Civil aviation, particularly air transport, prides on its pristine safety record, which disruptive drone technology—if not groomed to the peculiarities of the industry—may endanger.

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*Associate for aviation law and legal affairs at P.C. Sarajevo International Airport LLC Sarajevo.*
People whose perspective is limited by their own experience as a drone pilot are not always familiar with the odds and ends of aviation, which creates a rift between them and legacy experts: a rift, which EASA, national bodies, and industry representatives like UVS International have been trying to close through inclusive meetings and the endorsement of informative websites and mobile apps.\(^2\)

As it stands, though, the SORA method should not be read as promoting the economic growth of the drone industry at the expense of aviation safety—or vice versa. The method carefully considers both the ground and air risk of operations, and it does not preclude the professionals, such as ANSP personnel, from being involved in the assessment. Nor does the simplicity of the method *per se* suggest that important factors are left without proper attention. The results of the method in at least one study seem “largely in agreement” with detailed high-fidelity risk modelling (HFRM)\(^3\).

The problem with the given comparison is, according to ECA, that SORA actually relies too much on a quantitative approach and inadequately considers the complexity of unmanned aviation. According to the Association, the traditional approach to collision avoidance provides layered resilience, which cannot be substituted altogether with statistical methods. To achieve similar resilience, ECA provides essentially two suggestions. First, SORA should look at the intrinsic risk of mid-air collisions rather than potential fatalities; second, in order to ensure expertise about the operational volume, SORA should consult an independent and competent group of experts in certain operations. This would result in SORA competency centres, which could be qualified entities. The centres would be used to store and share data on operations and incidents, enhancing harmonization and safety.\(^4\)

There is some truth to ECA’s critique that SORA might fail to assess the ARC with sufficient rigor, since the method itself does not contain a procedure to thoroughly assess the operational volume. However, as discussed above, any risk mapping conducted by the appropriate parties supersedes the initial ARC which would result from the SORA flowchart. Regardless, SORA emphasizes that the initial assessment of the ARC is more of an assumption that must be validated by the ANSP in order to determine the actual collision risk. Finally, even the initial ARC does not simply focus on potential fatalities but rather the characteristics of the airspace (class, altitude, overflown area), which provide an estimated rate of encountering a manned aircraft.\(^5\) Therefore, concerns over resilience appear to be somewhat exaggerated.

Meanwhile, the consultation of competent third parties is something not excluded by the SORA process; as noted above (and in SORA itself), many issues not fully tackled by the method will still require cooperation of all stakeholders at the national and European level. When considering the establishment of centres with the ability to affect the exercise of public authority, other complications like equal representation and lobbying may come into play. Given the increasing importance of drones, it is also worthwhile to assess whether establishing centres for solely drone related issues makes sense. Drones, for now as disruptive technology, should remain under special scrutiny, but with the goal of achieving an airspace where they are integrated rather than treated as an anomaly.
The air law discussed in this article also applies to the four non-EU states (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland) that are members of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).


Of the unique features of drones vis-à-vis the traditional system of air law, see Anna Masutti and Filippo Tomasello, International Regulation of Non-Military Drones, pp. 13-20. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar (2018). In the context of airspace management, see also my previous take: Mikko Huttunen, The U-space Concept, 44(1) Air & Space 69 (2019).


Implementing Regulation (n 5); Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) .../... of 12 March 2019 on unmanned aircraft systems and on third-country operators of unmanned aircraft systems. See also Masutti and Tomasello (n 4), pp. 79-80. The reader is advised to note that, at the time of writing this, the Implementing and Delegated Regulation have not been published in the Official Journal of the European Union and thus have no number.

This includes themes discussed in this article, such as airworthiness and pilot licensing, but also separate issues like aerodromes. See EASA Civil drones (Unmanned aircraft), in fine. https://www.easa.europa.eu/easa-and-you/civil-drones-rpas (undated, accessed 29 May 2019). Under the previous Basic Regulation, the airworthiness of UAS was considered in Policy Statement E.Y01301: Airworthiness Certification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) (EASA 2009).

For an overview of ICAO’s ongoing developments regarding unmanned aviation, see e.g. ICAO Unmanned Aviation. https://www.icao.int/safety/ua/Pages/default.aspx (undated, accessed 29 May 2019). See in detail Masutti and Tomasello (n 4), passim.

The scope is thus limited although, for reasons of compatibility, SARPs are in many cases followed in domestic aviation, too.

Masutti and Tomasello (n 4), pp. 122-123.

Some reference is also made to the advisory efforts of the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol), which is not an EU agency.

Qualified entities are essentially legal or natural persons who are tasked with certain duties relating to certification or oversight. See Basic Regulation (n 6), Arts 3(11), 69. Whatever here is said of competent authorities also applies to QEs to the extent the former have charged the latter with their duties.
15 Ibid., Art. 30.
16 See Regulation 965/2012 (n 2), Annex I(1)(9).
17 Ibid., Annex III(ORO.DEC.100, Appendix I).
18 Ibid., Annex III(ORO.AOC.100) and Annex IV.
19 Implementing Regulation (n 5), Art 3(1)(b).
20 Since this article focuses on the specific category, discussion on AOCs in the certified category of drone operations is excluded.
21 Implementing Regulation (n 5), Art. 5(2).
23 Regulation 965/2012 (n 2), Annex III(ORO.GEN.200).
24 Implementing Regulation (n 5), Arts 11, 12.
25 Traditional measures have, of course, also faced criticism. See e.g. The ARMS Methodology for Operational Risk Assessment in Aviation Organizations (ARMS Working Group 2010).
30 Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA), Executive Summary, pp. 2-3 (JARUS 2019).
31 Draft acceptable means of compliance (AMC) and guidance material (GM) to Regulation …/… laying down rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned aircraft and to the Annex, p. 18. Regulation 965/2012 (n 2), Annex I(1)(2).
32 Regulation 965/2012 (n 2), Annex I(1)(2).
34 SORA (n 30), Executive Summary, p. 3 and Guidelines, pp. 26-30. See also Masutti and Tomasello (n 4), pp. 103-104; Introduction to SORA (n 33).
35 See SORA (n 30), Guidelines, pp. 19-29. For an exemplary case, see CORUS Intermediate Concept of Operations for U-Space, Annex C - SORA example (2019).
The concept followed the 2015 French decree on drones, which established four operational scenarios outlining the allowed operations to be conducted for non-recreational purposes. See Arrêté du 17 décembre 2015 relatif à la conception des aéronefs civils qui circulent sans personne à bord, aux conditions de leur empiot et aux capacités requises des personnes qui les utilisent, Annexe III(1.3); Masutti and Tomasello (n 4), p. 85.

Implementing Regulation (n 5), Art. 2(2)(6).


Implementing Regulation (n 5), Arts 2(2)(6), 5(5).

Another source of inspiration likely was the Italian drone regulation, according to which non-critical operations require a declaration, while critical operations require an authorisation. As of 2018, though, the regulation also incorporates the concept of standard scenarios in the case of critical operations. See Mezzi aerei a pilotaggio remote, Edizione 2 del 16 luglio 2015 Emendamento 4 del 21 maggio 2018, Arts 9 – 11.

Standard Scenarios (n 39), at 3:11.

Implementing Regulation (n 5), Arts 2(2)(9), 5(6)(a), 7(2)(2), 8(2) and Annex(C).

Basic Regulation (n 6), Arts 20-21, 23 and Annex IV(1-2).

Traditional measures have, of course, also faced criticism. See e.g. The ARMS Methodology for Operational Risk Assessment in Aviation Organisations (ARMS Working Group 2010).

Basic Regulation (n 6), Arts 20-21, 23 and Annex IV(3)

See Commission Regulation (EU) 2018/1042 of 23 July 2018 amending Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, as regards technical requirements and administrative procedures related to introducing support programmes, psychological assessment of flight crew, as well as systematic and random testing of psychoactive substances to ensure medical fitness of flight and cabin crew members, and as regards equipping newly manufactured turbine-powered aeroplanes with a maximum certified take-off mass of 5 700 kg or less and approved to carry six to nine passengers with a terrain awareness warning system.

Basic Regulation (n 6), Art. 55 and Annex IX(1.1, 2.3).

Implementing Regulation (n 5), Art. 8(2).

Ibid. The exception to this, pursuant to para. 3, is operating in the framework of model aircraft clubs or associations, where the authorisation is issued in accordance with Art. 16.

By remote crew, the SORA includes “any person involved in the mission.” See SORA (n 30), passim.


Ibid., Annex E, p. 17

Ibid., Annex C, p. 4.

See in my home country (Finland) e.g. Insta ILS Training, https://www.airhow.fi/en/training/ (undated, accessed 29 May 2019).

SORA (n 30), Annex E, p. 19.

Masutti and Tomasello (n 4), p. 18.

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61 See Basic Regulation (n 6), Art 2 and Annex


65 See EASA Certification Specifications for Normal-Category Aeroplanes: CS-23 (2003, as amended). Note that the categories of aircraft are not directly linked to the categories of operation.

66 Standard Scenarios (n 39), at 3:11.

67 Basic Regulation (n 6), Arts 10, 12. See in detail Regulation 748/2012 (n 63), Arts 2, 8, 9 and Annex I(A) (K).


69 Basic Regulation (n 6), Arts 55, 56 and Annex IX(1.2-1.4, 2.1-2.2).

70 The concept of “characteristic dimension” is not explained anywhere in the Delegated or Implementing Regulation. However, an earlier draft reveals that it refers to e.g. wingspan or rotor diameter. See Draft Annex to the Implementing Regulation, UAS.SPEC.020.

71 Delegated Regulation (n 7), Art. 40; Implementing Regulation (n 5), Art. 10. Note, however, that drones that are privately built, drones used in the framework of model aircraft clubs and associations, and certain drones already on the market are exempted from the described airworthiness rules. Of the developing airworthiness certification for drones, see Masutti and Tomasello (n 4), pp. 111-132.

72 SORA (n 30), Guidelines, p. 11.


75 Ibid., Annex E, pp. 6, 11.

76 Regulation 965/2012 (n 2), e.g. Annex III(ORO.GEN.110).

77 E.g. CS-23 (n 65), CS 23.2105(c), CS 23.2130(b).

78 Regulation 965/2012 (n 2), e.g. CAT.GEN.MPA.105(a)(12). See in detail Regulation 1321/2014 (n 67), Annex I(M.A.201(d)).


80 Introduction to SORA (n 33), at 1:02:45.

81 The concept of false balance has especially been studied within environmental journalism. See e.g. Michael Brüggemann and Sven Engesser, Beyond false balance: How interpretative journalism shapes media coverage of climate change, 42 Global Environmental Change 58 (2017).
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84 Cour-Harlo (n 29), p. 156.
85 ECA Position Paper (n 78).
86 SORA (n 30), Guidelines, p. 23.
Lion Air JT-610 Passenger Compensation: A Commentary and Review of the Current Progress

Ridha Aditya Nugraha*

• Brief Overview

It is indeed unfortunate that aircraft accident continues to occur in Indonesia. The latest accident, which leaves a big question mark regarding passenger protection and compensation, is the tragic Lion Air JT-610 flight enroute from Jakarta to Tanjung Pandan crash in the Java Sea on 29 October 2018, killing all passengers and crew onboard; with 189 fatalities making it the second deadliest aircraft accident in Indonesia.

Both flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder were successfully found in November 2018 and January 2019 respectively. Currently, the case is undergoing investigation with the Indonesian National Transportation Safety Commission (NTSC - Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi) in charge. It needs around one year before the NTSC announce its final official report revealing the cause of Lion Air JT-610 accident.

As one of the post-accident measures, Lion Air is obliged to compensate the heirs that their passengers left behind. The airline provided hotel accommodation for the passengers’ relatives in Jakarta and Bangka to ease and speed up the disaster victim identification (DVI) progress as well as administrative work during October 2018 to January 2019.

However, on 23 January 2019, numerous relatives of the passengers protested when the airline discontinued the accommodation without proper notice; highlighting three main outstanding issues, namely, the 64 victims that had not been found nor identified; the compensation that had not been paid; and the ongoing issues about the relatives of unidentified victims’ rights to be facilitated and accommodated. The rights of the passengers’ relatives were far from being fulfilled at that time.

The Ethiopian Airlines ET 302 crash on 10 March 2019 paved the way for further legal discussions. This accident involved a similar type of aircraft (Boeing 737 Max 8) and flight pattern with the Lion Air JT-610 accident.

* Air and Space Law Studies - International Business Law Program, Universitas Prasetiya Mulya, Jakarta, Indonesia. The views expressed are those of the author. Comments should be addressed to ridha.nugraha@pmbs.ac.id
This fact has raised speculations that something is not right with the aircraft design. If this is the case, noticing aircraft manufacturer liability could be triggered which means opening door for Lion Air to escape from its liability and potentially jeopardizes the relatives of passengers’ chance to obtain the compensation. Indeed, passengers’ rights in Indonesia is being tested. This article strives to identify the legal issues as well as loopholes concerning airline and aircraft manufacturer liability within the Indonesian legal framework in light of passenger protection.

- **The Indonesian Aviation Legal Framework**

At the moment, the Indonesian Minister Transportation Regulation No. 77 of 2011 (the “Minister Regulation No. 77”) regulates air carrier liability for death, (bodily) injury, and third-party damage for domestic flight. The application is aimed for domestic flight; even though the Minister Regulation No. 77 does not explicitly mention whether the regulation only covers domestic flight or also includes international flight. The latter option potentially leads to conflict of laws since international flight has already been regulated by the Montreal Convention of 1999 since 19 May 2017.

In regards to passenger’s death, the Minister Regulation No. 77 values a passenger’s life at 1.25 billion Indonesian Rupiah, or equivalent to approximately 63,598 SDR, for death resulting from of an accident or incident onboard an aircraft. In comparison with the global benchmark, such amount is around 56% of the Montreal Convention’s current maximum value for a passenger life which limit is 113,100 SDR. So far, there has not been any court proceeding nor challenge pertaining to this provision in the country.

Another relevant provision of the Minister Regulation No. 77 is its breakable limits if the passenger or their relative can prove that the accident was a result of the air carrier’s negligence or fault. This article encourages the protection of passengers’ rights and is in line with the global concept of liability established for international carriage - in this context the Montreal Convention of 1999. From the passengers’ relatives’ perspective, this is relieving news, especially where the loss of breadwinner(s) shall be appropriately compensated.

However, there is no stipulation regarding advance payment pertaining to passengers’ life - at the moment, advance payment exists only for baggage. This might be related to the fact that the Minister Regulation No. 77 was enacted six years prior to the ratification of the Montreal Convention of 1999, leaving advance payment issue for passenger death not being considered to be carried to the domestic law.

At the end, considering the unfortunate Lion Air JT-610 flew domestic route, national laws shall fully apply and leaves the Montreal Convention of 1999 not applicable at all.

- **The Current Progress and Ongoing Polemics Pertaining to Passengers Compensation**

As of today, more than six months after Lion Air JT-610 accident, numerous passengers’ relatives have not received any compensation. They were repeatedly hampered with a condition to sign the release and discharge agreement which forbids them from filing a lawsuit against any third party which caused the accident in order to receive the 1.25 billion Indonesian Rupiah compensation.
This situation is a breach towards the Indonesian Aviation Law of 2009 which clearly stipulates that any carrier is prohibited from signing agreements or set up requirements that nullify carrier’s liability or establish a lower compensation limit than it should be.\textsuperscript{8} Furthermore, the Minister Regulation No. 77 regulates that any loss of life shall be compensated for 1.25 billion Indonesian Rupiah and not a single cent less, regardless of age, gender or status.

If Lion Air or the insurers keep imposing the release and discharge agreement to be signed as a condition for cashing in such amount, it will potentially lead to an unlawful act according to the Indonesian legal regime. In other words, in this case there is no room for the release and discharge agreement; and any such agreement which has been signed by the passengers’ relatives shall be deemed as null and void.

Until March 2019, a total number of 68 passengers’ relatives or heirs have agreed to sign the release and discharge agreement.\textsuperscript{9} It would not be surprising if the number keep increasing since there is no clarity regarding passenger protection. The Ministry of Transportation has not made any official statements pertaining to the polemic of the release and discharge agreement.

Another thing which made the situation went downhill is the absence of advance payment for passenger death or injury provision within the Minister Regulation No. 77. Consequently, there is no legal obligation for the carrier to pay the 1.25 billion Indonesian Rupiah compensation in stages even though such compensation is important to cover the basic immediate needs, such as funeral as well as the passengers’ relatives’ important private matters, especially where those victims were breadwinners.

To this moment, following to the Lion Air JT-610 crash, it seems there is a failure to identify the distinction between airline liability and aircraft manufacturer liability. The passengers’ relatives and heirs are entitled to the 1.25 billion Indonesian Rupiah compensation from Lion Air through its insurer. However, the breakability of such tier shall depend on whether there is negligence on the airline. If it is the aircraft manufacturer’s, also known as product liability, then it shall protect Lion Air from facing unlimited liability.

Product liability, as Hursh defined, is the liability of a manufacturer, processor or non-manufacturing seller for injury to the person or property of a buyer or third party caused by a product which has been sold.\textsuperscript{10} An inadequate instruction for handling a product put on the market is considered as one of the three grounds for a successful product liability claim.\textsuperscript{11} This will lead to a tort action based on negligence, seeking responsibility from aircraft manufacturer and may held it liable.

What happened on 4 April 2019 could perhaps open the door to seal the fate of the aircraft manufacturer. Boeing CEO apologized for 346 lives that have been lost and acknowledged the role of the company’s flight-control system called Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) in two Boeing 737 Max 8 aircraft crashes. His comments followed the release of the Ethiopian Airlines crash report, where the Ethiopia’s transport minister said the crew had “performed all the procedures, repeatedly, provided by the manufacturer but was not able to control the aircraft”.\textsuperscript{12}
From a legal perspective, the apology could be considered as a multi-billion Dollar statement, since it may be considered as admitting negligence. As this is the case, foreseeing a chance to pursue legal action through manufacturing defect ground, many ambulance chasers from the United States have come to Indonesia. A few United States law firms have approached the passengers’ relatives and encouraged them to file a lawsuit against Boeing, mentioning the chance for a higher level of compensation.

From the passengers’ rights perspective, the main issue shall be whether the relatives and heirs are being well informed on the success rate of lawsuit in the United States soil. Even after everything that happened, Boeing is still the pride of America. Some law firms have a “no win no (legal) fee” policy for the passengers’ relatives and heirs. However, court fee is a different matter and usually will be borne by the defeated party. This information is rarely mentioned in public. The government should aware of this and ensure the protection of passengers’ relatives and heirs.

The most recent legal action, following the apology from Boeing’s CEO, on 4 April 2019, 24 passengers’ relatives and heirs have jointly issued a subpoena or demand letter to Lion Air. They demanded to receive a full compensation unconditionally, including the cancellation of requirement to sign the release and discharge agreement. The subpoena mentions that a failure to fulfill the demand shall lead to court litigation; which opens a chance that for the first time, an Indonesian court may handle passengers’ death following aircraft accident case in the realm of the Indonesian Aviation Law of 2009 and the Minister Regulation No. 77.

“In April 2019, numerous Lion Air JT-610 victims have applied for justice behind the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. However, they need to convince judges that the case belong there following to Boeing efforts/consideration to shift the forum to Indonesia/the Indonesian court. The aircraft manufacturer indicates the latter considering the fact where the plane went down and where most of the victims lived. This maneuver creates loopholes for Boeing to skirt around its responsibility and lessen its financial liability, since the Indonesian judicial system does not provide the same protections as the U.S. Debates are ongoing and the Indonesian Ministry of Transportation has not announce any official statement to date.

In the end, Indonesian airlines flying domestic routes are obliged to ensure its passengers’ rights, including compensation for death or injury, through insurance. Airline shall suffer no losses since they have already paid a certain amount of insurance policy included within ticket sales, including loss of cargo and baggage. Their unwillingness to settle such compensation raises a big question mark on what happens in the Indonesian aviation industry.
• The Way Forward

Passenger protection in Indonesia is still at its ebb. The helpless situation faced by passengers’ relatives and heirs for the past several months confirms such premise.

It must be highlighted that compensation for passenger death is not easy to be obtained, even though it has been regulated straightforwardly within the enacted law.

One essential step is to regulate advance payment provision for passenger death and injury within the current legal framework. Therefore, the Minister Regulation No. 77 should be revised.

A logical fallacy that potentially happens in Indonesia is the failure to distinguish airline liability from aircraft manufacturer liability, which had sacrificed the right of passengers’ relatives and heirs so far. All eyes are watching the Ministry of Transportation as the regulator, deemed to make a firm decision pertaining to the current compensation polemic.
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3 Ratified through the Indonesian Presidential Regulation No. 95/2016. Date of the deposit of the instrument of ratification on 20 March 2017.

4 The Indonesian Minister of Transportation Regulation No. 77 Year 2011 regarding Liability of the Air Carriers, art. 3.

5 The Indonesian Law No. 1 Year 2009 on Aviation, art. 180. See the elucidation part, which becomes the basis of interpretation.

6 The Indonesian Minister of Transportation Regulation No. 77 Year 2011, art. 5(4).


8 The Indonesian Law No. 1 Year 2009 on Aviation, art. 186(1).


15 Lion Air JT-610 Crash. Case No. 1:18-cv-07686.

16 According to the procedure, Boeing needs to make the request to the U.S. Court within 45 days. See https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-01/boeing Pushing to move crash lawsuit from hometown to Indonesia accessed on 29 May 2019.

17 Ibid.

18 The Indonesian Law No. 1 Year 2009 on Aviation, art. 180.
SESAR is the EU’s Single Skies technological programme, aimed essentially at improving ATM’s (Air Traffic Management) performance, which acts basically as a guardian of safety, but also aims at enabling interoperability at global level.

After the completion of SESAR 1 (2008-’16), the first phase of the Research and Development Programme, phase 2 is proceeding in the form of SESAR 2020.

As far as content is concerned, SESAR wants to guarantee the sustainable development of safe air transport in the EU, with the following specific objectives: bring about a three-fold increase in capacity, reduce by 10% the environmental impact per flight, cut air traffic management costs by 50% and improve safety by a factor of 10. Indeed, the whole set-up is geared towards a series of new functionalities all aimed at enhanced safety, which is actually the guiding principle of the entire programme. In 2019, SESAR’s Joint Undertaking (SJU) published a document, called “A proposal for the future architecture of the European Airspace”, which highlights that safety should be SESAR’s top priority.

SESAR’s concept consists, inter alia, of new modes for operating aircraft, improving safety as well as system-wide information management, providing secure connections for all ATM stakeholders who share the same data, assisting operators, such as controllers and pilots, with new, automated functions to ease their workload and guide them through complex decision-making processes.

In terms of semantics, the notion “prepose” includes exclusively air carrier’s employees. Legal theory and court practice established criteria for delimitation of the notions of air carrier’s “servant” and “agent” from other legal persons participating in a chain of the international air transport of cargo:

- Basic criterion is that the damage was sustained during the international air transport of cargo.
- Servant and agent were performing their duties in order to realize the contract on air carriage of cargo.
- Carrier’s servant or agent performed their jobs in accordance with the work contract or agency contract.
- Carrier’s agent does not have a monopoly at the market.

The most controversial issue of the notion “agent” in terms of provisions of the Warsaw system and Montreal convention is whether the notion “agent” covers a monopolistic status at the market of the legal person that concluded a contract with air carrier. Historical, language related and systemic interpretation of the notion “agency” cannot help in interpretation of the “agent”, and they do not establish a legal foothold for the conclusion that due to monopolistic status of a legal person providing its services to air carrier, it cannot be considered the carrier’s agent. Judicial practice took a view that legal persons having a legal monopoly cannot be understood as carrier’s agents; thus the Air traffic control centre, meteo service providers, flight controllers, Customs officers or Directorate of Civil Aviation are not considered servants or agents of air carriers in terms of provisions of the Warsaw system and Montreal convention.

As far as implementation is concerned, the Commission and the Member States should coordinate with the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) to ensure that the safety aspects stemming from Reg. (EU)2018/1139 are taken into due account.

These include the setting, revision and implementation of key performance indicators (FAB).

The key indicators should be in line with the European Plan for Safety referred to in Art. 6 of Reg. (EU) 2018/1139, and should be used to in order to establish achievable, sustainable, realistic and time-bound performance targets at Union level, national level or FAB-level.

They must cover both en route and terminal air navigation services, but also network functions, the idea being to improve the performance of the network as a whole. According to this logic, the national supervisory authorities are the ones responsible for designing performance plans at national or functional air space level. These plans must contain binding performance targets, based on key performance indicators.
When determining those targets, due attention should be given to the interdependencies that exist between them as a consequence of the strong links between the key performance areas, whilst never losing sight of the all-important safety objectives.

For the sake of coherence, the Member States should submit their draft performance plans to the Commission for assessment and review. First the Commission will verify whether the performance plans are complete, and if so, the Commission will go on to assess whether the proposed performance targets are in line with the Union-wide performance ones. Member States can only adopt and publish the final versions of their plans after they have passed the Commission’s scrutiny.

If necessary, in order to gain an insight into the detailed functioning of the performance scheme, the Commission may ask for input from the Performance Review Body. This entity has an advisory function on anything related to the performance of air navigation services and network functions in the Single European Sky as referred to in Commission Implementing Decision (EU)2016/2296 of the 16th of December 2016.

Only recently, on the 11th of March 2019, the Commission launched a call for applications for the selection of experts for the above-mentioned body.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that on the 15th of April 2019 the so-called “wise persons group”, a high-level aviation experts on the future of air traffic management in Europe, handed over to the European Commission a set of 10 recommendations on how to make the European air traffic management system more efficient, flexible and sustainable in the future. They recommended using the performance and charging scheme to support the digitalisation of air traffic services.
The European Council adopted a new Regulation (n. 712/2019) to safeguard the competitiveness of EU air carriers against unfair competition and other practise implemented by non-EU airlines. The new legislation has entered into force in May 2019 and goes beyond the existing Regulation n. 868/2004, which has proved to be ineffective because, under the old Regulation, a legitimate complaint could be filed by the European air carriers whose collective share constitutes a major proportion of the total Community supply of those services.

The new Regulation provides for the protection of the EU-operators not only against subsidisation and unfair pricing practices (as provided for the old above-mentioned Regulation), but also from any situations where a Union air carrier is subject to differential treatment without objective justification. For example, discriminatory treatment concerning administrative procedure, the allocation of slots or the prices for and access to ground handling services.

In particular, the Regulation allows to the EC - on its own initiative or on complaint by Member State, Union air carrier or association of Union air carriers - to initiate proceedings if it considers that there are sufficient evidence of the existence of all the following circumstances: a) a practice distorting competition, adopted by a third country or a third-country entity; b) injury or threat of injury to one or more Union air carriers; c) a causal link between the alleged practice and the alleged injury or threat of injury (Article 4).

Once the investigation is open, concerned Member States can support it by supplying all relevant and available information. In addition, if it is necessary, the Commission can also decide to carry out its inquiries in third countries’ territory, but this power is limited to the relevant third’s state authorization, which is unlikely to be obtained.

EC administers may suspend the investigation of complaint if it considers more appropriate to address the practice distorting competition exclusively under the dispute settlement procedures established by another applicable air transport agreement signed by the European Union.
In any event, the proceedings must be completed within 20 months, which may be extended in “duly justified case”. The possible period of suspension of the investigation is not included in these 20 months.

When the investigation finds that a practice distorting competition, adopted by a third country or a third-country entity, has caused an actual injury to the Union air carriers concerned, the EC administers may be imposed redressive measures aimed at offsetting that injury. Those instruments have not to be adopted whether their effects would go against European interests or when the third country or third-country entity concerned has voluntarily eliminated the practice affecting competition.

The redressive measures imposed by the EC shall take form of «financial duties or any operational measure of equivalent or lesser value, such as the suspension of concessions, of services owed or of other rights of the third-country air carrier» (Article 14.4) and have however to respect the principle of proportionality. To this end, those tools have to be provisional, limited in a specific geographic area and shall not exceed what is necessary to remedy the injury to the Union air carriers concerned. In any events, redressive measures shall never consist in the suspension or limitation of traffic rights granted by a Member State to a third country.

It is now difficult to predict whether the regulation briefly examined will be able to enforce a fair global aviation market and, consequently, to bring benefits to EU air carriers and consumers. However, in the absence of internationally harmonised solutions, an efficient regulatory instrument at least at regional level is more than welcome.
This book is a most welcome contribution and excellent resource for technical professionals and jurists, as well as simply aviation enthusiasts, willing to enter the complex and fascinating world of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) and the extraordinary innovative potential and social benefit that can be gained from their use for civilian purposes.

The two authors, of renowned and indisputable reputation, qualification and authority, rise to the challenge with great skill. They analyse and comment in an admirable and organised progression, all critical aspects of the civil use of UASs, which are addressed through a comprehensive approach and developed topically, including safety and security issues, operations, liability, insurance, privacy and data protection. It is my belief, as regulator, that this book represents an outstanding basis to build on further debate and comprehension of an evolving and pioneering area such as the civil use of UASs and move towards its social acceptance and international standardisation.

Alessio Quaranta, Director General, Italian Civil Aviation Authority (ENAC)
The civil use of drones, in this book also referred to as Unmanned Aircraft Systems, has received significant attention from an operational perspective. Operators are discovering the multifaceted potential of these craft both for civil and military use. The authors, Anna Masutti and Filippo Tomasello, are prominent experts and authors in the field of international and European air law and should be praised for picking up the challenge to approach the civil use of drones from an impressive variety of angles. Their effort should all the more be respected because many of the questions which affect such operations are either in statu nascendi or they are not yet regulated at all. Hence this work forms an important and essential contribution not only to the establishment of the status quo of domestic, European and international regulation but also a source of inspiration for legislators, policy makers, academics and stakeholders on how to shape a new regulatory environment.

Pablo Mendes de Leon, Professor of Air and Space Law and Head of Department/Executive Chair of the Department of Air and Space Law, Leiden University

The work of Anna Masutti and Filippo Tomasello sheds light on the fascinating subject of non-military drones, which are generating both excitement and concerns about how they should be regulated. The possibilities that “unmanned aviation” opens up in various fields, including the environmental dimension, are the subject of careful legal and technical analysis by the authors, who assess in a very comprehensive way the current situation, while at the same time exploring the various legal solutions available for regulators. It is of course obvious that the European Union has a leading role to play in this context. This is an essential read for anyone wishing to understand how to develop an effective regulatory approach when confronted with an emerging new phenomenon, which puts into question more traditional models. Both Mrs Masutti and Mr Tomasello are world recognised experts who approach this subject on the basis of an original methodology which draws on the most recent debates and events in this field. I strongly recommend this brilliant book for those who want to understand the challenges of the future and deal with them throughout a pragmatic and at the same time rigorous European legal approach.

Daniel Calleja Crespo, Director-General for Environment, European Commission - DG Environment, Director for Air Transport at the European Commission from November 2004 to February 2011
The International Bar Association (IBA) - the global voice of the legal profession - is the foremost organisation for international legal practitioners, bar associations and law societies. Established in 1947, shortly after the creation of the United Nations, it was born out of the conviction that an organisation made up of the world’s bar associations could contribute to global stability and peace through the administration of justice. In the ensuing 70 years since its creation, the organisation has evolved, from an association comprised exclusively of bar associations and law societies, to one that incorporates individual international lawyers and entire law firms. The present membership is comprised of more than 80,000 individual international lawyers from most of the world’s leading law firms and some 190 bar associations and law societies spanning more than 170 countries.

The 2019 Annual Conference will be held in Seoul, South Korea, a thriving metropolis that mixes the traditional with the modern - from skyscrapers, high-tech subways, K-pop culture and K-beauty to Buddhist temples, palaces and street markets and a history going back 5,000 years. This technology forward, but deeply traditional city, located between the North Asian powerhouses of Japan and China, will be an ideal location for the largest and most prestigious event for international lawyers.

- **Location**: The 2019 IBA Annual Conference will be held at the COEX Convention & Exhibition Center in Seoul on the 22-27 September 2019.


- **Professor Anna Masutti will speak in the hot topic Aviation matters Panel**: [https://www.int-bar.org/Conferences/conf840/ProgrammeSearch/Results/Index.cfm?Search=ListSessionsByCommittee&CommitteeGuid=9E78EFB8-8C10-497E-9231-92AA82C63E54](https://www.int-bar.org/Conferences/conf840/ProgrammeSearch/Results/Index.cfm?Search=ListSessionsByCommittee&CommitteeGuid=9E78EFB8-8C10-497E-9231-92AA82C63E54)
The twelfth edition of this highly-anticipated conference will be held at PlazaCentre-Ville EVO Building, 777 Robert-Bourassa

This event will bring together world-leading aviation liability, insurance and finance professionals who will participate in a wide range of expert panels including the following:

- Vital updates on Recent Developments in Air Carrier Passenger Liability
- A blue-ribbon panel marking the 20th Anniversary of the Montreal Convention
- Current liability issues facing Airports, ANSPs, and Maintenance Providers
- Top litigators discuss Current Products Liability and Major Accident Litigation, Plaintiff and Defendant Strategies, and a Case Study
- A global regulatory update asks Whether Governments are Building a Cathedral of Regulation?
- Trends and developments for insurers in the Management and Settlement of Aerospace Insurance Claims
- Evaluating recent trends in Air Cargo Carrier Liability
- Aircraft finance specialists tackle the “Yelp-ification” of the Cape Town Convention After 15 Years in Force
- Leaders of Montreal’s global aviation community present Updates on Liability Issues from the Key Montreal-based International Aviation Organisations
- Recent airport incidents form the backdrop for discussion of Liability Issues Arising from Drone Disruption of Air Travel
FORTHCOMING EVENTS

- Meet the aviation lawyers of the future in a new panel featuring Rising Aviation Professionals Discussing Key Moments of the 2019 Conference

- In addition, the Conference will host keynote luncheons and a gala reception and dinner/dance, and facilitate networking among attorneys, insurers, air carriers, manufacturers and government representatives.

For more information:


- Professor Anna Masutti will speak in the hot topic Aviation matters Panel:
Every year Wala conference gathers over 150 delegates from more than 40 countries around the world, representing all Continents. Our 11th edition will be taking place in Bogota, Colombia, on October 9-11, 2019, kindly hosted by El Dorado Airport.

The Paris Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation was signed on October 13, 1919, establishing the first international convention for the control and development of air transport. The Paris Convention formed the basis for civil aviation law to this time. On October 7, 1919, KLM became the first commercial air carrier. The world’s second oldest airline, the Colombian-German Air Transport Company (SCADTA) - now Avianca - was formed in Colombia on December 5, 1919.

At WALA XI - Bogota 2019 airport lawyers and other industry experts will meet to discuss how they can embrace this new century of airport law, regulation and economics. Air transport demand is forecast to double in the next 20 years. Airport lawyers will need to deliver legal solutions that address airport capacity, regulation, and economics at the same time as meeting the overarching challenges of climate change and the environment.

About WALA

The Worldwide Airport Lawyers Association (WALA) was conceived in Prague, Czech Republic, on September 2007, where destiny gathered airport lawyers from across the world. The attendees agreed that aviation and aeronautical law in each of their respective countries was outdated, leaving them unprepared to face the new and rapidly changing reality of airport ownership and operations, which required specialized legal concepts and knowledge. Consequently, they agreed on the need to create and promote a worldwide forum; a meeting place where aviation lawyers and all other interested parties could develop, share and debate relevant issues in the field of airport law.

Seven months later, WALA became a reality with its first conference taking place in Spain. Since then, subsequent annual meetings have taken place in Madrid, Lisbon, Dallas, Amsterdam, Montreal, Buenos Aires, Athens, Bologna and London.

WALA is a not-for-profit corporation, founded to promote and assist in cooperation among legal advisers and other public and private sectors of the worldwide airport, aviation and aeronautical industries.

For more information about WALA please visit: